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A City Club Report on
Ballot Measures 61 & 57
Published in the City Club of Portland Bulletin
Vol. 91, No. 12, Friday, October 10, 2008

STATE OF OREGON MEASURE 61:

Creates mandatory minimum prison sentences for certain theft, identity theft,
forgery, drug, and burglary crimes.

STATE OF OREGON MEASURE 57:

Increases sentences for drug trafficking, theft against elderly and specified repeat
property and identity theft crimes; requires addiction treatment for certain specified
offenders.
Oregonians will vote on two ballot measures in November designed to increase the level of
punishment for drug and property crimes. Measure 61 is an initiative petition that will impose a
mandatory prison sentence for a number of property and drug-related crimes, with no possibility
of a reduced sentence. Measure 57 is a legislative referral presented to voters as an alternative to
Measure 61, which many legislators regarded as too costly and inflexible. Measure 57 increases the
sentences for property and drug-related crimes and for identity fraud, establishes mandatory minimum sentences for certain repeat offenses, but also continues to allow some flexibility in sentencing, consistent with sentencing guidelines. Assuming both measures receive a majority of favorable
votes, the one with the greater number of “yes” votes will become law.
Because these two measures are in competition, City Club chose to have one research report address both. Your committee has considered the measures primarily with respect to two concerns:
their effectiveness in reducing criminal activity and their cost. Both measures will significantly
increase the cost of corrections by incarcerating more people. This increase can come only at the
expense of other state programs since neither measure provides additional revenue.
Because your committee concluded that Measure 61 would do serious damage to other state
programs and that there are less expensive and, at the same time, more effective ways of reducing
property and drug-related crimes, your committee unanimously recommends a “NO” vote on
Measure 61.
Your committee also concluded that Measure 57 is preferable to Measure 61. It would be less expensive and would provide treatment for drug offenses. There is good evidence that treatment can
be more effective and cheaper than incarceration in preventing property crimes. Still, the majority
found that the share of the state general fund going to the Department of Corrections is already the
greatest of any state and concluded that any increase would do significant damage to other state
programs. It also found that property crimes are decreasing, so there is no pressing need for this
kind of legislation at this time. The majority recommends a “NO” vote on Measure 57.
A minority agreed with the Legislature that the electorate will likely want perpetrators to be held
accountable and will most likely vote for a measure increasing punishment. Although the minority
concluded that both measures are bad policy, voting “no” on Measure 57 may increase the likelihood that Measure 61 will pass. The minority recommends a “YES” vote on Measure 57.
City Club members will vote on this report on Friday, October 10, 2008. Until the membership
votes, City Club of Portland does not have an official position on this report. The outcome of
the vote will be reported in the City Club Bulletin dated Friday, October 24, 2008 and online at
www.pdxcityclub.org.

STATE OF OREGON MEASURE 61
Creates mandatory minimum prison sentences for certain theft, identity theft,
forgery, drug, and burglary crimes.
At present, property and drug crimes are punished under sentencing guidelines established
in 1989. These guidelines set presumptive sentences for crimes based on the seriousness
of the crime and the criminal record, if any, of the perpetrator. A judge may decrease the
presumptive sentence but bears the burden of proof in justifying such a departure. The assumption behind Measure 61 is that the guidelines are insufficiently strict and fail to require
incarceration for crimes that would justify it. An often-cited example is that a person may be
convicted of a property crime four times and still be eligible for probation.
Although some committee members were concerned that the current sentencing guidelines
might not be sufficiently severe in some cases, your committee nevertheless is unanimous
in recommending a “no” vote on Measure 61 for several reasons. Some of those grounds
are the same as those the City Club committee urged in 1998 for the defeat of a similar
measure (also numbered Measure 61) that would also have increased the length of certain
prison sentences. That committee concluded the following: “This measure would increase
the sentences for a wide variety of property and person crimes without consideration of the
need for additional incarceration…and without consideration of the financial and other
resources needed to provide for it.” (Because of an Oregon Supreme Court decision concerning the manner in which petition signatures were counted for the former Measure 61, the
Secretary of State did not count the votes cast for the measure.) The present Measure 61
would similarly place additional demands on the state budget by causing an estimated
4,000 to 6,000 more prisoners to be housed in Oregon’s prison system. The additional funds
needed for the increased prison population could be met only by cutting other state services
or raising taxes.
Nor does your committee see that there is a crime wave that calls for a radical response
such as this measure proposes. The rate of property crime in Oregon, though still high in
comparison with other states, has declined sharply in recent years.
To be sure, any crime is one too many, and is shocking and painful to its victim, but the
needs of the criminal justice system must be weighed against other important state activities. Your committee is concerned, for example, that Oregon spends a higher percentage
of its general funds on corrections than any other state. Meanwhile its support of higher
education is among the lowest and it is at the very bottom in the ratio of state police to
population. Several states have found that mandatory minimum sentences have led to huge
prison populations and have placed such a large demand on state budgets that they have
been forced to cut back on other services. They have therefore turned to other, more effective and less expensive ways of dealing with non-violent offenders. Measure 61 would likely
make Oregon go through the same costly experience.
Finally, there is good evidence that, for drug crimes, treatment is far more effective than
incarceration in terms both of cost and in preventing drug-related crime. The property crime
rate has also dropped dramatically in the past two years. Witnesses who testified before
your committee attributed this drop largely to Oregon’s new law that makes medicines
containing pseudoephedrine available only by prescription. In short, it is possible to reduce
the crime rate at very little cost to the state by means other than increased incarceration.
While incarceration leads to some decline in the crime rate, no evidence presented to your
committee indicated that the mandatory minimum sentences provided in Measure 61 would
lead to a significant reduction in property and drug crimes.
Your committee unanimously recommends a “NO” vote on Measure 61.

STATE OF OREGON MEASURE 57
Increases sentences for drug trafficking, theft against elderly and specified repeat
property and identity theft crimes; requires addiction treatment for certain
specified offenders.
Members of the Legislature reacted to Measure 61 in much the same way as this committee—that is, with concern that it would be expensive and divert funds from other important
state programs. However, the Legislature concluded that Measure 61 would likely pass given
that “get-tough-on-crime” measures generally pass. The Legislature also relied on a poll
suggesting that Measure 61 would likely be approved by voters.
The Legislature therefore referred Measure 57 to the voters as an alternative to Measure 61.
This alternative measure provides for increased sentences for property crimes and mandatory sentences for certain repeat offenses. Significantly, Measure 57 also provides treatment for drug offenses. The measure also preserves some discretion for judges in deciding
punishment, which your committee sees as important in promoting the fair administration
of justice in our court system. Measure 57 would cost less and would almost certainly have
better success in dealing with drug and drug-induced crimes than Measure 61. However, it
would still cost the state a great deal (approximately $143 million a year after four years),
because it would result in an estimated 1600 additional prisoners in the Oregon prison
system. Therefore it would, though to a lesser extent than Measure 61, cut into other state
programs and services. It should be remembered that many programs and services besides
the correctional system have a role in preventing crime.
Your committee thus found itself faced with a strategic dilemma. Although your committee
overwhelmingly believes that neither measure would be good for the state, voting “No”
on Measure 57 might increase the likelihood that Measure 61 would pass. The minority
recommends a “YES” vote on Measure 57.
The majority of your committee, after debating the merits of principle versus strategy,
decided that, because both measures would be bad policy for the state, it would recommend a “No” vote on both measures. The evidence examined supports the conclusion that
long prison sentences for drug crimes and for most property crimes are counter-productive.
Incarceration in some cases is certainly appropriate and effective, but it should not be used
when there are more effective and cheaper ways of discouraging much of the criminal activity addressed by these two measures.
Incarceration also creates social problems such as the loss of a breadwinner and the separation of parents and children. This is especially true of the incarceration of women, and this
measure would increase the number of women in prison. Finally, it seemed unacceptable for
the state to allocate still more money to corrections from the limited state General Fund at
the expense of other programs.
The majority recommends a “NO” vote on Measure 57.

INTRODUCTION
Ballot Measure 61 will appear on the ballot as follows:
CREATES MANDATORY MINIMUM PRISON SENTENCES FOR CERTAIN THEFT, IDENTITY
THEFT, FORGERY, DRUG, AND BURGLARY CRIMES.
RESULT OF “YES” VOTE: “Yes” vote creates mandatory minimum prison sentences for certain
crimes, including burglary, forgery, theft, manufacture/delivery of methamphetamine, heroin,
cocaine, or methylenedioxymethamphtamine, under specified circumstances.
RESULT OF “NO” VOTE: “No” vote retains current law, which does not require that persons
convicted of the crimes specified in the measure serve mandatory minimum prison sentences.
SUMMARY: Measure creates mandatory minimum prison sentences for specified crimes for
which current law does not require mandatory minimums. Requires 36-month minimums for
identity theft, first degree burglary, and Class A felony manufacture/delivery of methamphetamine, heroin, cocaine, or methylenedioxymethamphtamine; 30-month minimums for Class B
felony manufacture/delivery of same specified controlled substances. For offenders with one or
more prior felony convictions, or two or more prior misdemeanor convictions, measure requires
18-month minimums for first degree forgery, motor vehicle theft; 14-month minimums for first
degree theft, second degree burglary. Prohibits reductions in sentences required by measure.
Sentences must be served in state prisons, not in county jails. State must reimburse counties for
pretrial incarceration costs for persons sentenced under measure. Other provisions.
Estimate of Financial Impact
The measure will require additional state spending of $8 million to $10 million in the first year,
$67 million to $88 million in the second year, $122 million to $178 million in the third year,
$164 million to $247 million in the fourth year, and $161 million to $274 million in each year
after that. The measure does not require additional local government spending. The measure will
require the state to borrow between $1.1 billion and $1.3 billion to build new prisons between
2010 and 2017. The state will repay those amounts plus interest of $709 million to $844 million
over 25 years. The measure requires state payments to local government of $2 million to $5
million in the first year and $10 million to $19 million each year after that. The measure does not
affect the amount of funds collected for state government.
(The caption and summary were prepared by the attorney general and certified by the
secretary of state.)

City Club’s Board of Governors chartered this study to analyze Measures 61 and 57 and assist
Club members and the public to better understand the implications of the measures and to
recommend “yes” or “no” votes. The eleven members of your committee were screened for
conflicts of interest and public positions on the subject of the measures. The study was conducted during August and September 2008. Committee members interviewed proponents and
opponents of the measures and persons with professional knowledge about the issues raised
by the measures. Your committee viewed relevant articles, research reports, past City Club
reports and other material.
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Ballot Measure 57 will appear on the Ballot as follows:
INCREASES SENTENCES FOR DRUG TRAFFICKING, THEFT AGAINST ELDERLY AND
SPECIFIED REPEAT PROPERTY AND IDENTITY THEFT CRIMES; REQUIRES ADDICTION
TREATMENT FOR CERTAIN SPECIFIED OFFENDERS.
RESULT OF “YES” VOTE: “Yes” vote increases sentences for drug trafficking (methamphetamine, heroin, “ecstasy,” cocaine), theft against elderly and specified repeat and property and
identity theft crimes; requires addiction treatment for certain offenders; establishes this measure
as alternative to other specified measure on this ballot to impose minimum sentences for listed
crimes.
RESULT OF “NO” VOTE: “No” vote retains current laws, which provide lesser sentences for
specified crimes and do not require treatment for addicted offenders.
SUMMARY: This measure increases prison sentences for specified drug and property crimes as
follows:
• Trafficking of methamphetamine, heroin, “ecstasy,” or cocaine: 34-130 months, depending on
the quantity of drugs and criminal history;
• Aggravated theft of over $10,000 where victim is elderly: 16-45 months, depending on criminal history;
• Repeat offenses of identity theft, burglary, theft, robbery, mail theft, forgery, criminal mischief,
credit card and check fraud: 18-30 months or 24-36 months, depending on seriousness of
crime and number of past convictions.
This measure also requires treatment for certain addicted offenders at risk of reoffending;
imposes sanctions for those who refuse treatment. Limits court’s ability to reduce sentences.
Provides grants to counties for operation of local jails, treatment services, intensive supervision
and drug courts.
If this measure passes with more votes than other specified measure on this ballot to impose
minimum sentences for listed crimes, this measure controls and other measure will have no
effect. If this measure passes with fewer votes than other specified measure on this ballot to
impose minimum sentences for listed crimes, this measure will have no effect.
Estimate of Financial Impact
The measure will require additional state spending of $9 million in the first year, $74 million in
the second year, $79 million in the third year, $106 million in the fourth year, and more than $143
million after that. The measure does not require additional local government spending. The state
will borrow $314 million from 2010 to 2017 to build new prison space. The state will repay those
amounts plus interest of $203 million over 25 years. The measure does not affect the amount of
funds collected for state government.
(The caption and summary were prepared by the attorney general and certified by the
secretary of state.)
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BACKGROUND
EXPLANATION OF MEASURES 61 & 57
Ballot Measure 61 was initiated by Kevin
Mannix, a lawyer, former state legislator,
and former candidate for governor. It is an
attempt to do for property crimes what Measure 11 did for crimes against persons. Measure 57 was referred by the Legislature as an
alternative to Measure 61. Many legislators
concluded that, although property crimes
were often treated too leniently, Measure 61
was too severe, did not allow the possibility
of treatment for addiction (a cause of much
property crime), and did not allow judges and
juries enough flexibility to address individual
differences among offenders. There was also
concern that Measure 61’s cost would result
in cuts to other state programs.1
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN RECENT
OREGON HISTORY
History since 1989
According to Article I, Section 15 of the Oregon Constitution,“Laws for the punishment
of crime shall be founded on these principles:
protection of society, personal responsibility,
accountability for one’s actions, and reformation.” Oregon’s criminal statutes establish the
maximum sentence for each crime, generally
by categorizing the crime within a specified
class of felony or misdemeanor. The maximum penalties for Class A, B, and C felonies
are, respectively, 20, 10 and 5 years. Misdemeanors are limited to one year. Murder and
aggravated murder are not classified and are
subject to separate sentencing provisions.2
Before 1989, Oregon judges in criminal
cases had considerable freedom in assigning punishment. Thus the kind and degree
of punishment given for a particular offense
might depend on which judge was presiding.
Moreover, the actual time served was often
less than the sentence pronounced by the
judge because the Parole Board could reduce
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the sentence for varied reasons, including the
problem of overcrowded prisons.3
The disparities in sentencing led the Legislature in 1989 to adopt guidelines for judges to
determine the form and level of punishment
for criminal acts. These guidelines produced
a matrix that matched the seriousness of the
crime and the criminal history, if any, of the
defendant. Thus, in imposing a sentence, a
judge consults the matrix using the nature
of the offense as one coordinate and the
criminal history of the accused as the other.
These two coordinates will direct the judge
to a range of allowable sentences. Guidelines
also include the possibility of reducing a sentence to a limited degree to encourage good
behavior. The guidelines allow a judge to increase or decrease the punishment, but he or
she must provide substantial and compelling
reasons for doing so. Such changes are called
“departures.” A departure can be a change
in the duration of the punishment or in the
form of disposition (e.g. probation versus
imprisonment) and will be based on either
aggravating or mitigating circumstances. A
judge’s freedom to increase punishment has
been limited, however, by recent decisions of
the United States Supreme Court that, in the
case of a jury trial, require the reasons for an
increase to be presented to the jury.4
In 1994, voters passed Measure 11, which
provides mandatory minimum sentences for
twenty-six felonies against persons, when
the perpetrator is fifteen years of age or
older. The judge cannot reduce the sentence,
but may increase it. Thus, for these specified
crimes, the sentencing guidelines no longer
apply. The term required by Measure 11 must
be served in its entirety, with no reduction for
any reason, including good behavior.
In 1997, the Legislature amended the sentencing guidelines as they applied to eleven
property felonies by increasing the presumptive sentence in the case of repeat offenders.
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Also in 1997, concerns among practitioners
about the severity of Measure 11 led to the
passage of Senate Bill 1049, which allowed
judges to use the sentencing guidelines
rather than the Measure 11 rules for certain
offenses. The same bill added three new
offenses to the Measure 11 list calling for
fixed sentences. Finally, Senate Bill 1145 was
enforced beginning on January 1, 1997. This
bill required that those serving sentences of
twelve months or less would be confined to
local facilities.5
Now, in 2008, enough valid signatures have
been obtained to place before the voters
Measure 61 described above. In effect, it
represents the same kind of policy for property crimes as that applied by Measure 11 to
crimes against persons, specifically, lengthened terms of incarceration with no reduction
or parole for any reason. The Legislature has
responded by referring Measure 57 to the
voters.
Effects of Measure 11
Because Measure 61 is so close in spirit and
in likely practical consequences to Measure
11, the history and consequences of Measure
11 are relevant to your committee’s consideration of Measure 61. In 2003, the Federal
Department of Justice helped fund a peerreviewed study of the effects of Measure
11 on Oregon’s system of criminal justice,
with a special focus on Multnomah, Lane,
and Marion counties. The research described
in this report was conducted by the RAND
Corporation, and the data in this section are
from that report.6 According to that study,
Measure 11 was opposed by the majority of
practitioners in the legal system, but opposition was not well organized, while support
for it was well-funded and well-organized.
The RAND study suggests that Measure 11
neither completely realized the fears of its
opponents nor lived up to the hopes of its advocates. By eliminating the power of judges
to mitigate sentences, the measure increased
the power of prosecutors. Prosecutors
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questioned by those doing the study were
unanimous that the sentences imposed by
Measure 11 were too long for some offenses
and that not all offenses eligible for charging
under Measure 11 should be prosecuted as
Measure 11 offenses. Since the prosecutor
has some discretion in how to prosecute an
offense, there has been an increase in the
number of plea bargains in which the accused has chosen to accept punishment for
a lesser offense in order to avoid the longer
sentence prescribed by Measure 11. The
number of cases sentenced under Measure
11 declined steadily after 1995, while the
number under non-Measure 11 guidelines
increased. One result of that development
is that sentences imposed for the lesser,
non-Measure 11 offenses, have tended to be
longer than usual for those offenses.
At the same time, there has been a sharp
increase in the number of felony offenders imprisoned who are under 18 years of
age, reflecting Measure 11’s requirement
that offenders 15 or older be tried as adults
for Measure 11 crimes. Moreover, prior to
Measure 11, while most offenders with no
criminal record were sentenced to probation
for Measure 11 crimes, now nearly all are
sentenced to prison. Thus, a higher proportion
of those sentenced to prison have no prior
criminal record, a change from 38 percent in
1994 to 56 percent in 1999.
The study was not able to give a definitive
answer to the question of whether Measure
11 has increased public safety and reduced
crime. Violent crime rates declined after
the passage of Measure 11, a change that
could be attributed to Measure 11 acting as
a deterrent or it keeping offenders in prison
where they cannot commit crimes against
the public. But crime decreased generally
throughout the nation in the 1990s, including
in those states that did not have minimum
sentencing laws. There are various theories
about the reason for the decrease, but no
universally accepted explanation.
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Prison Incarceration Rate Comparison
U. S. Total
Oregon

Property Crime Rate Comparison

U. S. Total
Oregon

Source: Oregon Criminal Justice Commission

Levels of incarceration in Oregon
and the U.S.
Oregon has experienced an enormous growth
in its prison population in recent years, from
approximately 3,000 in 1980 to 13,624 on
May 1, 2008, of whom 1,073 were women.
The rate of increase has been roughly the
same for male and female prisoners. During
the same period, the population of the state
rose from 2,633,156 to 3,690,505.7 Thus,
while the population of the state grew by 40
percent, the prison population grew by 300
percent. In 1980, 1.21 persons per thousand
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in Oregon were incarcerated, but by 2005,
that number had tripled to 3.68 per thousand. At present, roughly 0.3 to 0.4 percent
of the state’s population is incarcerated.8
This percentage is somewhat lower than the
national average, which is approaching 1
percent and is the highest in the world. The
share of Oregon’s state budget going to corrections (10.9 percent) is the highest of any
state in the nation.9 Oregon is one of only
five states whose budget for the Department
of Corrections exceeds the budget for higher
education.10
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Official Price Tag Estimate
2009
BM 61

$8 – 10

BM 57

$9

2010

2011

$67 – 88 $122 – 178
$74

2012

Out Years

Debt

Interest
(25 years)

$164 – 247 $161 – 274 $1,100 – 1,300 $709 – 844

$79

$106

$143

$314

$203

Prices are in millions of dollars.
Source: Financial Impact Statement, Oregon Secretary of State

Crime rates in Oregon
Since 1980, combined property and person
crimes have dropped 35 percent. Violent
crime has dropped 45 percent. Currently,
Oregon is 18th in the nation for the level of
property crimes (1 being the highest) and
38th for violent crimes. This is a sharp change
from 2005, when Oregon was the fourth
highest in the country for property crimes. The
rate of violent crime has fallen even faster.11
FINANCIAL IMPACT OF THE PASSAGE OF
MEASURES 61 & 57
Because both measures will result in keeping more people in prison and keeping
them there longer, they will clearly require
additional state spending to maintain and
build more prisons. According to the official
financial impact statement published by the
Secretary of State, other costs include supervising more criminals released from prison,
providing foster care for children of parents
convicted under these measures, providing
lawyers for defendants who cannot afford
an attorney, and, in the case of Measure 57,
making state grants to counties for drug
treatment. As neither measure provides additional revenue to cover these costs, they
would have to be paid for from the current
budget.
Cost of Measure 57
According to the state’s official financial
impact statement, Measure 57 will cost $9
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million during the first year. The cost will then
rise to more than $143 million each year
after the fourth year. The state will need to
borrow a total of $314 million from 2010 to
2017 to expand prison capacity. Repaying
those amounts will cost the state $203 million in interest over twenty-five years.12
Cost of Measure 61
Again, according to the state’s official impact
statement, Measure 61 will cost the state
from $8 to $10 million in the first year, $67 to
$88 million in the second year, $122 to $178
million in the third year, and $164 to $274
million for each year after that. It will require
the state to borrow and repay $1.1 to $1.3
billion to build new prisons between 2010
and 2017. Interest on those loans will require
$709 to $844 million over a twenty-five year
period. This measure would require the state
to pay local governments between $2 and
$5 million in the first year and between $10
and $19 million, or 4 percent of the General
Fund, each year after that.13 Both measures
may produce additional costs for defense
attorneys for defendants who cannot afford
counsel, for supervising criminals after they
are released from prison, and, in the case
of Measure 57, for assessing the results of
treatment.
Kevin Mannix, one of the chief petitioners
of this measure, has been quoted in The
Oregonian as calling these cost estimates for
Measure 61 a “fantasy,” but your committee
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has no source for different numbers.14 He did,
in speaking to your committee, point out that
the state enjoyed a large increase in revenue
in the past year, but a one-year increase in
revenue does not adequately address the
problem of the long-term costs of Measure
61. He also argued that not every prisoner
need be incarcerated behind the high walls
of a state prison, but could be doing useful work in a forest camp. However, as Max
Williams, Director of the Oregon Department
of Corrections, told your committee, the ratio
of guards to prisoners needs to be higher in a
work camp, which would increase rather than
reduce the cost to the state.
The experience of Measure 11 does suggest
that prosecutors will use the threat of a Measure 61 charge to encourage accused persons
to accept punishment on a lesser charge,
so that the actual cost may be less than the
forecast. Still, the cost would certainly be
considerable and would likely require cuts to
other services.
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ARGUMENTS PRO AND CON
ARGUMENTS FOR MEASURE 61
Proponents of Measure 61 have made the
following arguments in favor of the measure:
• Property crime in Oregon is high in comparison with other states. Oregon ranks
18 (1 being the highest) in the level of
property crime in the country.
• Measure 61 would enforce the important
principle of accountability. People who
commit property crimes would be held accountable for their actions.
• There is a demonstrated link between
incarceration and crime rates, in that an increase in incarceration leads to a decrease
in crime.
• The present sentencing guidelines for property and drug crimes are too lenient. For
example, individuals can commit up to five
property crimes before facing any punishment more serious than probation.
• Property crimes affect the poor disproportionately. They need the protection that
Measure 61 would provide.
• The Legislature has failed to address the issue of sentencing reform. Under the stimulus of this measure, it has finally acted and
produced the rival measure to this one,
Measure 57. But Measure 57 does not
prescribe fixed sentences for crimes. The
minimum period of incarceration imposed
by Measure 61 – 18 months – is the minimum necessary to achieve reformation.
• Incarceration has the effect of removing
the individual from the environment that
fostered his or her criminal behavior.
• Prosecutors will still be able to charge an
accused with a lesser crime if enforcing the
provisions of this law would be excessively
harsh.
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• The experience of Measure 11 shows that
mandatory sentences can reduce crime.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST MEASURE 61
Opponents of Measure 61 have made the following arguments against the measure:
• Measure 61 would be far too costly. Unless another source of revenue is found, it
would cause greater damage to other state
services than Measure 57.
• Measure 61 provides incarceration but no
rehabilitative treatment, when evidence
from Oregon and other states indicates
that, for non-violent drug offenses, treatment is a more effective and less expensive
way to improve public safety.
• Prosecutors have used Measure 11 as a
way of convincing accused persons to
accept plea bargains by pleading to lesser
charges. In that way, they have mitigated
what was universally felt to be the excessive severity of Measure 11, while still
ensuring that the offender was punished.
Measure 61, however, provides a financial incentive to prosecutors to prosecute
under its provisions, because counties are
to be compensated for housing prisoners
convicted under Measure 61.
• Other states that have experimented with
mandatory minimum sentencing laws
have been forced, by the sheer expense of
incarcerating the resulting large number of
prisoners, to rethink their system of punishment and to turn to methods other than
imprisonment. Measure 61 would send
Oregon down a similar road that other
states have been forced to abandon.
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• Because sentences under Measure 61
cannot be reduced for any reason, there
is no way for the system to reward good
behavior or evidence of reform. This will
only make more difficult the task of those
charged with managing inmates.
• The level and downward trend of criminal activity in Oregon, including property
crimes, do not indicate that the state is facing a crisis that would warrant so drastic
a change in the severity of sentencing as
that proposed by Measure 61.
ARGUMENTS FOR MEASURE 57
Proponents of Measure 57 have made the
following arguments in favor of the measure:
• Because past experience and recent polling
indicate that voters will likely vote in favor
of anti-crime legislation, Measure 57 will
ensure that property crimes will be dealt
with more severely while still avoiding the
cost and other harmful effects of Measure
61.
• Measure 57 will provide treatment for
some drug related crimes, thereby reducing
the financial and social costs of imprisonment.
• Measure 57 will be less costly than Measure 61 during a time when the revenues
for the state will probably decline and
the need for other human services will
increase.
• Measure 57 will provide judges more
authority in sentencing, whereas under
Measure 61 the discretion will reside more
with prosecutors.
• Measure 57 will stiffen the penalties for
some first-time offenses that are widely
considered too soft.

reformation while helping those charged
with managing the prison population.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST MEASURE 57
(IN FAVOR OF MEASURE 61)
Proponents of Measure 61 have made the
following argument against Measure 57:
• Measure 57 will result in the release of
perpetrators who would be incarcerated
under Measure 61.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST BOTH MEASURES
57 & 61
Opponents of both Measures 57 and 61 have
made the following arguments against the
measures:
• Both measures increase costs for the Department of Corrections, which can be met
only by cutting other state services. Many
or most of those services, such as courts,
state police and higher education, are already under-funded by national standards.
Many of these services are also important
for the prevention of crime; adequately
funding them makes Oregon a better place
to live.
• Because more women than men commit
identity theft, both measures will sharply
increase the number of women incarcerated. That will lead to a problem for the
Department of Corrections in providing
housing for the additional number of
women incarcerated and will also increase
the number of children who will require
foster care. Because both measures will
take money from the general fund, they
will likely cause a reduction in the funding
for the Department of Human Services,
which manages the foster care system.

• Measure 57 allows the reduction of sentences for good behavior, thus encouraging
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DISCUSSION
DO LAWS IMPOSING LONG MINIMUM
SENTENCES REDUCE CRIME?
According to a study by the Pew Memorial
Trust, the growth in the nation’s prison population has not been driven by an increase
in the crime rate but rather by legislated
increases in the severity of punishment. In
Florida, for example, “get-tough on crime”
laws were followed by an increase in prison
population but no greater or lesser decline in
the crime rate than, for example, New York,
where the prison population has decreased.15
That is not to say that incarceration cannot
help to reduce crime rates. A recent study
by the Washington State Institute of Public
Policy cited by the Oregon Criminal Justice System Report to the Legislature says
that, for Oregon, a 10 percent increase in
the incarceration rate led to a 2.6 percent
decrease in the crime rate. The effect is larger
for violent crime. But the law of diminishing
returns applies to incarceration. That is, as
the incarceration rate goes up, after a certain
point, the rate of reduction in crime goes
down.16 The economic significance of this fact
is discussed later under “Economic Impact of
Incarceration.”
IMPACT OF INCARCERATION V. DRUG
TREATMENT ON RECIDIVISM
About 93 percent of those incarcerated in
Oregon will be released and will return to society.17 The recidivism rate (the rate at which
those released commit more crime) is one
measure of the effectiveness of incarceration as a means of reform. For Oregon, the
recidivism rate is about 31 percent, distinctly
better than the national average of about 47
percent.18
Because a high percentage of property crimes
are committed to support addiction, your
committee has looked for evidence to see if
treatment for addiction would be a reasonable alternative to incarceration, in terms of
both cost and public safety.
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In 1991 Multnomah County instituted the
STOP (Sanction Treatment Opportunity
Progress) Drug Diversion program to reduce
the backlog of drug related cases and to
encourage treatment of those convicted of
first-time drug offenses. The program was
expanded in 1995 to address a larger population and to provide access to health, mental
health, family intervention and aftercare
services. In 1998 the program was evaluated
to determine its effectiveness for participants
as well as its cost effectiveness for taxpayers.19 Researchers measured success partly by
examining the subsequent arrest record for
participants compared with a similar group of
non-participants.
Participants were divided into two groups:
graduates and those who participated in but
did not complete the program. In general,
while graduates of the program had the best
record, even those who completed only part
of the program had a much better record
than non-participants. In a two-year period,
these two groups of participants in general
had 72 percent fewer subsequent drug arrests than non-participants. More specifically,
of 100 graduates, 7 were arrested on drug
charges, while, of 100 non-participants, 31
had subsequent arrests. In the estimation of
the researcher, the annual savings for Multnomah County taxpayers was $10.2 million.
More recently, in 2008, the Portland State
University Regional Research Institute for
Human Services published a study on the
link between drug abuse and crime and the
effectiveness of treatment in changing those
behaviors.20 It examined the outcome of two
of Central City Concern’s treatment programs: the Mentor program and the Alcohol
and Drug–Free Program. The study showed
that the link between drug abuse and crime
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is very clear: 93 percent of the participants
had committed crimes and 76 percent said
that their crimes were to support their drug
habit. Almost half had bought and sold drugs.
Their drug habits cost them on average $206
a day. According to this study, their activities
cost the City of Portland at least $2 million a
year.

for each household in Oregon for the entire
criminal justice system, including corrections,
courts, and state police, has risen since 1985
from $632 to $1,133 in constant dollars.23 By
far the greatest cost increase has been in the
Department of Corrections, while the cost of
state police has actually declined 19 percent.24 That reflects the fact that the number
of state police per population is now 50 perThe group studied was relatively small, 87
cent of what it was in 1991 and is the lowest
individuals, and somewhat older than many
in the country.25 The costs of the criminal
addicts (average age 42). These facts may
justice system are paid directly from the state
limit the validity of the findings. Still, the
results of treatment were generally posigeneral fund, so that any increase in funding,
tive. There was a 93
absent additional
percent reduction
resources, must come
“The costs of the criminal from cuts to other
in the number who
committed crimes. The justice system are paid
state services. Some
average number of
directly from the state
of these services, such
“clean” days was 325
as education and
general fund, so that
for all participants.
human services, have
any increase in funding,
They credited their
a role to play in the
success to having safe absent additional
prevention of criminal
resources, must come
housing, peer supactivity.
port, structured drug
from cuts to other
Of course, there is
treatment, and the
state services. Some of
compassion they felt
an economic as well
these services, such as
from others.
as a social benefit in
education and human
preventing criminals
In November 2000,
services, have a role to
from committing
California voters applay in the prevention of
crimes by incarceratproved a ballot meacriminal
activity.”
ing them. The cost
sure (Proposition 36),
of property crimes is
which requires certain
obvious, but vionon-violent drug offenders to enter treatment
lent crimes also cost society, in the form of
programs instead of prison. Early reports
increased medical expenses, lost productivof a similar law passed in Arizona in 1996
ity, and survivor counseling. So preventing
have been positive, and other state diversion
crimes does produce a savings to society. The
programs appear to be working as well.21
Washington study and the Oregon Criminal
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF INCARCERATION
Justice Commission report mentioned above
put a dollar figure on the costs to determine
Keeping persons in prison is expensive. The
how society benefits by incarcerating crimicost per inmate in the Oregon system is
22
nals. These numbers suggest that the law
$77.78 per day, and, as is stated above, the
of diminishing returns has set in, as Oregon
cost of the Department of Corrections is the
largest item in the state’s budget. The cost
and Washington have incarcerated more and
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more persons. Specifically, for Oregon, every
additional dollar spent on incarceration in
1994 produced $3.31 of benefit to the state
in the form of avoided expense, whereas in
2005, each additional dollar produced only
$1.03 in benefit.
The figures for Washington are most interesting for this report because they are broken
down among violent, property, and drug
crimes—and the ballot measures addressed
in this document are concerned with the
latter two. Those figures show that, in the
same period, while return of a dollar invested
in incarceration in Washington went from
$9.57 to $4.35 for violent crimes, for property
crimes it went from $2.36 to $1.10, and for
drug crimes from $0.37 to $0.35.26
On the last issue, drug crimes, the study
concluded that it costs taxpayers more to
incarcerate drug offenders than the value of
the crimes avoided and that “well researchbased and well implemented rehabilitation
and prevention programs give taxpayers a
better return than increasing the incarceration rate for drug-involved offenders.” The
Oregon Criminal Justice Commission came
to a similar conclusion: “While incarcerating
property offenders is very close to breaking
even, incarcerating drug offenders is not cost
effective.”27 A 1997 RAND study also concluded that “mandatory minimum sentences
are not justifiable on the basis of reducing
cocaine consumption, cocaine expenditures,
or drug-related crime.”28
The steady increase in the number of people
incarcerated has in many states put a severe
strain on state budgets and has forced states
to cut back on other services. A few states,
notably California, Kansas and Texas, have
reversed the trend by finding ways of addressing crime other than imprisonment.29
In California, Proposition 36 mentioned
above, by putting 24,000 non-violent drug
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offenders in treatment programs, reduced the
number of prison beds needed by 11,000. It
also produced further savings by reducing
the number of prisoners ending up in parole
supervision programs. It is possible that this
initiative was stimulated by a report by a
1992 CALDATA (Research by the California
Department of Alcohol and Drug Programs)
report, which found that for every dollar
spent on treating substance abuse, $7.00 was
saved.30
MEASURES 61 & 57 AND THE INITIATIVE
SYSTEM
Measure 61 illustrates some of the problems
with the initiative system that were pointed
out in City Club’s 2008 report, “Making
the Initiative Work for Oregon.” Legislation requires taking into account differing
and even conflicting points of view. It also
requires investigation of the relevant facts
and consulting with those who have relevant
knowledge. That is why most legislation
involves compromise. It can be a messy and
unattractive process. As Otto von Bismarck
said, “If you love the law or sausages, don’t
watch either of them being made.” The initiative process avoids compromise. Too often,
initiatives represent one side of a many-sided
issue. Such is certainly the case with Measure
61. Kevin Mannix testified to your Committee
that the measure’s primary goal is accountability. That is certainly a legitimate goal, and
Measure 61 would achieve it.
The justice system, however, has other goals.
There is the matter of restraint. A person is
restrained from committing crimes while
in prison, and to that extent, Measure 61
provides it. But once that person returns
to society, as most do, the restraint is gone
unless it is internalized. That is why the issue
of rehabilitation is so crucial to the safety of
society, and, from that point of view, Measure
61 fails for all the reasons that have been
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shown in this study. For many of the crimes
covered by this measure, treatment has a
better record than incarceration in reducing
recidivism.
That Measure 57 is a better measure is a consequence of its having been developed in a
cooperative process involving the Legislature
and stakeholders. So, the experience of these
two measures tends to support the recommendation of the 2008 City Club report that
all initiatives qualifying for the ballot should
receive legislative review.
MEASURES 61 & 57 AND THE CURRENT
SITUATION IN OREGON

crisis. The reduced size of the state police
force has been mentioned. Another is higher
education. Salaries for faculties in the Oregon
University System have been for years near
the bottom in comparison with similar
systems. Other services, such as K-12 education, the Oregon Health Plan, and foster care,
together with the state’s infrastructure, could
all be adversely affected by spending more of
the state’s limited resources on corrections.
It makes little sense to divert more money
to corrections, when its share is the highest
in the nation, and away from state services
whose share of the state budget are among
the lowest in the nation. It makes still less
sense when there are more economical ways
of getting better results.

The timing of both these measures is strange
given the current context. One might infer
from reading them that Oregon is sufferSENTENCING POLICY
ing from a rising crime rate, whereas, as we
One reason for preferring Measure 57 to
have seen, the opposite is the case. Measure
Measure 61 is that the former allows judges
57 could be seen as
a degree of discreresponding to an
“The timing of both these tion in deciding
emergency, but the
sentences, provided
real emergency is
measures is strange given the judge can offer a
Measure 61. Morethe current context. One
rational justification
over, both measures
might infer from reading
for the discretionary
are presented at a
sentence. Rational
them
that
Oregon
is
time when other
sentencing takes into
suffering
from
a
rising
states, having exaccount the parcrime rate, whereas,
perienced the effect
ticularities of the case,
of similar minimum
as we have seen, the
including the severity
sentence laws, are
opposite is the case.”
of the crime and the
backing away from
character and history
them and looking for
of the perpetrator.
more economical and more effective ways of
Oregon’s sentencing guidelines try to achieve
dealing with the same sort of crime. It seems
exactly that by providing a presumptive
singularly unwise not to benefit from the
range of sentences, but allowing departures
experience of other states.
under appropriate circumstances. Measure 61
In Oregon there are genuinely urgent needs
allows a judge only to increase a sentence,
that would be made worse by the enactment
though that power has been limited by the
of these measures. Ever since the property
United States Supreme Court in the case of a
tax limitations in Measure 5 were passed,
jury trial.
some of Oregon’s state services have been
In testifying before your committee, Measure
in an almost permanent state of budgetary
61’s chief petitioner defended its apparent
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inflexibility by referring to the history of Measure 11 and the way that its supposedly mandatory sentences were not imposed because
prosecutors used the threat of a Measure 11
sentence to convince the accused to accept
punishment for a lesser charge. That this
happened is confirmed by the RAND analysis
mentioned above, and it has certainly made
Measure 11 less severe in practice than it
was in design. To say that, however, is to
acknowledge, first, that Measure 61 will not
deliver the certainty of sentencing that it
promises and second that such certainty is
not desirable. In the opinion of your committee, as between the judge and the prosecutor,
it is better that the judge, who is professionally disinterested, retain the power to adjust
the punishment to the facts of the particular case. That is particularly true given the
evidence showing that judges have exercised
their power to grant downward departures
from the sentencing guidelines in less than
10 percent of the cases.31 In other words,
in the vast majority of the cases, judges are
imposing sentences within the presumptive
range set forth in the guidelines.

Report on Ballot Measures 61 & 57

17

CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS
UNANIMOUS CONCLUSIONS REGARDING
MEASURE 61

MAJORITY CONCLUSIONS REGARDING
MEASURE 57

• Measure 61 has been projected to cost the
state between $161 million and $274 million
a year. This cost would have to be met by cutting other state services.

• Measure 57 has been projected to cost
ultimately $143 million a year. This cost
would have to be met by cutting other state
services.

• There is good evidence that treatment is
more cost-effective that incarceration in
preventing drug-related crimes.

• Although Measure 57 provides for treatment
for drug addiction, it also calls for increased
incarceration. There is good evidence that
treatment would be more cost effective.

• Other states have abandoned mandatory
minimum sentences for property crimes as
prohibitively expensive.
• Oregon already spends a larger share of its
general fund on corrections than any other
state.
• The rate of property crime in Oregon is
already in decline, without this measure.
• Incarcerating more persons will increase certain social problems while taking money from
those agencies that address those problems.

UNANIMOUS RECOMMENDATION
REGARDING MEASURE 61
Your committee unanimously recommends
a “NO” vote on Measure 61.
Respectfully submitted,
Jim Blackwood, Jr.
William Connor
John Cooper
F. Jean Hart
Heather Kmetz
Charles Mitchell
Alexander Sachon
Ethan Scarle
Richard York
Chris Zahas
David Aman, chair
John Horvick, research adviser
Tony Iaccarino, research & policy director
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• Oregon already spends a larger share of its
general fund on corrections than any other
state.
• The rate of property crime in Oregon is
already in decline, without this measure.
• Incarcerating more persons will increase certain social problems while taking money from
those agencies that address those problems.

MAJORITY RECOMMENDATION
REGARDING MEASURE 57
The majority recommends a “NO” vote on
Measure 57.
Respectfully submitted,
William Connor
John Cooper
F. Jean Hart
Charles Mitchell
Ethan Scarle
Richard York
David Aman, chair

MINORITY CONCLUSIONS
While agreeing with your entire committee that
Measures 57 and 61 are both flawed public
policy, the minority concludes that a principled
stand against both measures risks a victory for
Measure 61, with its unacceptable consequenc-
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es for Oregon’s criminal justice system, criminal
rehabilitation and state budget.
Oregon has a long history of the initiative
process driving its criminal justice philosophy
and design. Measure 61 seeks to capitalize on
the electorate’s historical bias toward accountability-based justice. In 1994, Measure 11,
which initiated mandatory minimum sentences
for violent crime, garnered 65 percent of the
vote. In 2000, Measure 94, an attempt to repeal
Measure 11, was opposed by 73 percent of the
voters.
In some part, the appearance of Measure 61 is
the result of the Legislature’s failure to lead the
public debate on criminal justice, rehabilitation
and property crimes. According to testimony
by both Representative Greg Macpherson and
Kevin Mannix, a measure costing $45 million
over two years was allowed to die in committee.
Had the Legislature balanced financial considerations with the reality of the publicly-favored
accountability philosophy, we may have avoided
the considerably higher financial impact of both
Measures 57 and 61.
All public policy is subject to the dual influences of politics and compromise. Having failed
to address property crimes in any meaningful
way before the appearance of Measure 61, the
Legislature was forced to create a thoughtful
and politically viable response. This legislative
referral reflects the sound political judgment
that the voters would support Measure 61 if
no alternative were offered. That Measure 57
is better legislation is a consequence of its
having been developed in a cooperative process
between the Legislature and stakeholders, as
recommended in the 2008 City Club report on
reforming the initiative, referendum and referral
systems in Oregon.
The Legislature’s referral of Measure 57 creates
a unique opportunity for the voters to choose
between two criminal justice philosophies:
an expensive, completely punitive design and
a more measured approach that attempts to
address drug addiction, an overwhelming cause
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of property crimes. Measure 57 also attempts
to mitigate the financial impact of an entirely
punishment-based approach for property crimes.
Advocates for both initiatives agree that there
will be no meaningful campaign against both
measures. The case against either measure will
only be made as part of the advocacy for one
measure or the other. Should the voters approve
both measures, the one with the most votes will
become law.
A broad coalition including state legislators, the
governor, future Attorney General John Kroger,
law enforcement, unions and public interest
organizations will vigorously support a “yes”
campaign for Measure 57. State Representative
Macpherson, a Measure 57 co-author, characterized a “no” vote on both measures as the
equivalent of a “yes” vote for Measure 61.
In short, the minority has reached the following
conclusions:
• Measure 57 represents a reasonable compromise between the public’s desire for holding
perpetrators responsible for their actions and
the need for a less expensive and less simply
punitive system.
• Without Measure 57, there is a strong probability that voters will approve the much
more expensive Measure 61. Thus a “no”
vote on Measure 57 may be in effect a “yes”
vote on Measure 61.
• Measure 57 recognizes the value of treat-

ment for drug addiction and provides for it.
MINORITY RECOMMENDATION
The minority recommends a “YES” vote on
Measure 57.
Respectfully submitted,
Jim Blackwood, Jr.
Heather Kmetz
Alexander Sachon
Chris Zahas
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